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Abstract
The article looks at the new challenges the assertive 
Chinese foreign policy is representing for the 
regional geopolitical order in Asia. It  follows the 
recent developments in the region mainly regarding 
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and 
examines how the pressure in the regions are pushing 
China to look for other directions to its geopolitical 
projections, mainly toward the West implementing 
the New Silk Road project and deepening the 
cooperation with Russia. Meanwhile, the strong US 
presence in the Asian Pacific region was a guarantee 
of a “long peace” for more than 50 years. The lasting 
geopolitical order is changing due to the constant rise 
THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CHINESE REFORM
52 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD
of the Chinese economy and the increasing on its military spending, challenging 
other Asian regional powers like India and Japan to counterbalance the Chinese 
influence in the region, and effectively engaging other partners like Malaysia and 
Philippines. China is now proposing a multidirectional attitude, trying to develop 
the relations towards the East as well as to the states westwards from its own 
borders.     
Key words: Geopolitics, Territorial Disputes, Asia Pacific, China
LA GEOPOLÍTICA DE LA REFORMA CHINA
Resumen
El artículo analiza los nuevos desafíos que la enérgica política exterior China 
representa para el orden geopolítico regional de Asia. Sigue los recientes cambios 
en la región sobre todo en lo que concierne a las disputas territoriales en el 
Mar del Sur de China y examina la manera en la que presión en las regiones 
empuja a China a mirar en otras direcciones para sus proyecciones geopolíticas, 
especialmente hacia Occidente al implementar el proyecto de la Nueva Ruta de 
la Seda y profundizando la cooperación con Rusia. Al mismo tiempo, la fuerte 
presencia de los Estados Unidos en la región del Pacífico Asiático fue durante 
más de 50 años una garantía de “paz larga”.   El duradero orden político está 
cambiando debido al constante ascenso de la economía china y al incremento 
de su gasto militar,  desafiando a otros poderes regionales asiáticos como India y 
Japón a contrarrestar la influencia china en la región, y a eficazmente involucrar 
a otros socios como Malasia y Filipinas. China está actualmente proponiendo 
una actitud multidireccional, intentando desarrollar las relaciones con Oriente al 
igual que con los estados al occidente de sus propias fronteras   
Palabras clave: Geopolítica, disputas territoriales, Pacífico Asiático, China. 
A GEOPOLÍTICA DA REFORMA CHINA
Resumo
O artigo analisa os novos desafios que a energética política exterior da China 
representa para a ordem geopolítico regional da Ásia. Continua as recentes 
mudanças na região sobre tudo no que se diz respeito as disputas territoriais 
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no Mar do Sul da China e examina a maneira e pressão nas regiões, empurram 
a China a olhar em outras direções para as suas projeções geopolíticas, 
especialmente para o Ocidente, ao realizar o projeto da Nova Rota da Seda e 
aprofundando a cooperação com a Rússia. Ao mesmo tempo a forte presença 
dos Estados Unidos na região do Pacífico Asiático foi durante mais de 50 anos 
uma garantia da “longa paz ”. A duradeira ordem política está sendo mudada 
devido ao constante aumento da economia China e ao incremento do seu gasto 
militar,  desafiando a outros poderes regionais asiáticos como Índia e Japão,  a 
contrariar a influência china na região e a satisfatoriamente envolver a outros 
sócios como Malásia e Filipinas. China está atualmente propondo uma atitude 
multidirecional, tentando desenvolver as relações com o Oriente, ao igual que 
com os estados ao ocidente de suas próprias fronteiras. 
Palavras-chave: Geopolítica, disputas territoriais, Pacífico Asiático, China.
Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to explain 
the recent geopolitical developments 
in Asia during the Chinese reform’s 
upturn. The main argument is that 
the world will have to accept the new 
Chinese role in the global order and get 
used to the more assertive and flexible 
Chinese geopolitical projections in 
order to achieve its strategic goals. 
Even if China is generally considered 
a status quo power with little interest 
in changing the global order, the 
geopolitical projection outwards its 
own territory is a natural step in the 
development of Chinese strategic 
thinking. After a long period of Chinese 
soft power promoted by growing 
trade exchanges with the states of 
Asia Pacific region, China is taking 
the steps to develop the capability 
to actively protect its interests in 
the “near abroad”, and at the same 
time promoting deeper economic 
cooperation with central Asian and 
European countries denominated as 
“Beijing consensus” and expressed 
mainly by the project of the New Silk 
Road. The ruling balance in the Asian 
Pacific, based on the USA’s military 
supremacy and its alliance system, 
could be effective in the future, but 
the rising nationalist and populist 
tensions in Asia could spark a local 
conflict that could have lasting impacts 
not only on the affected region, but 
due to the growing interdependence 
of the Chinese economic cooperation 
the overall polarization could not 
be avoided. In contrast, a regional 
multilateral forum of negotiations 
would be a more reliable tool for the 
region’s stability, the creation of which 
is due to the growing tensions still not 
actual.                 
THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CHINESE REFORM
54 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD
The changing character of the 
geopolitical order
There is no doubt that the 
unprecedented rise of the Chinese 
economy since the 1978 reforms 
will cause a huge impact on the 
distribution of power among the 
states in the international system. In 
broader terms, the Chinese economic 
miracle will bring a reconfiguration 
of the current geopolitical order not 
only to the Asia - Pacific region but the 
impact will be perceived on a global 
scale as well. One thing seems to be 
clear: what the world is witnessing is a 
remarkable economic transformation. 
The number of people engaged in the 
modern global economy has doubled 
in the past two decades and could 
double again in the next few decades 
(White, 2009). Consequently, the 
largest increase of economic activities 
in any comparable period in history 
can be observed; this is so as huge 
populations around the world have 
moved from low-productivity to high-
productivity forms of work. It can be 
assumed that the volume of these 
revolutionary changes bring implicitly 
a transformation of the economic 
weight of states (Genereux, 2016).
In the period after World War II, it was 
largely assumed that the dominant 
factor for the geostrategic supremacy 
was the military capacity of the states; 
however, there is a recent need 
for correcting this assumption. The 
decisive component of the geopolitical 
projection of the states and the 
sustainability of those projects rely 
more on their economic superiority. 
The United States’ global GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) share was 17.1 % 
in 2011. In contrast, the Chinese’s 
was 14.9 % (and it keeps constantly 
increasing). According to Bloomberg 
News Agency, China surpassed the 
US economy in the power purchasing 
parity measure in 2014, and by 
2024, it may reach the position 
of the world’s biggest economy 
(Bloomberg, 2014). This is followed 
by China’s increasing participation in 
international trade: seven of the ten 
most important container ports are 
now located in China; meaning that 
more than half of the world’s annual 
merchant fleets pass through the 
straits of Malacca, Sunda Lombok and 
Makassar (Stratfor,2014).
China’s upsurge presents a challenge 
to the US on a field on which it has 
not been confronted for the last 50 
years: the unrestricted economic 
supremacy; this presents a completely 
new situation to deal with. In the same 
sense, China’s growing economic 
power can reshape the global order 
by defying the position of the United 
States in the new century’s economic 
and strategic gravity centre: Asia.
China’s growing economic weight is the 
only relevant power that could possibly 
erode the US’ strategic dominance in 
the Western Pacific; a region marked 
by a long period of peace (practically, 
the last mayor war was Vietnam’s, 
which ended in 1975) that underwent 
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few short regional conflicts1. Despite 
the recent economic slowdown with 
its serious global implications, China 
continues in its actual foreign policy, 
as a part of the Chinese Communist 
Party legitimacy rests partially on the 
promise of “the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation”, a concept that 
inherently incorporates the current 
trade policy with its more assertive 
stand to the territorial claims in East 
and South China Sea, and even with 
a slowdown China has the resources 
and motivation to continue growing 
its military budget. (CFR, 2016)   The 
main question for the future would be 
whether the Chinese rise may actually 
be considered a peaceful process or 
there would be a certain probability 
of some sort of armed struggle 
between China and the US. There is 
no clear answer to this question and 
the possible scenario for the future 
development of the Sino-US relations 
is an object of the intensive study 
and case studies both in the US and 
China (Zhong, Finkelstein). According 
to the US’s point of view, three main 
approaches can be distinguished 
concerning this question from three 
different theorists’ perspectives: the 
primacists, the exceptionalists, and the 
pragmatists (Evans, 2011). Primacist 
scholars such as Aaron L. Friedberg 
(Friedberg, 2011), John J. Mearsheimer 
(Mearsheimer, 2014), and Hugh White 
(White, 2009) point out that the most 
important factor of state survival is its 
ability to acquire as much power as 
possible, in the military, the economic, 
and the social spheres. During this 
process, the rising power is naturally 
challenging the ruling hegemonic 
power and this challenge can reach 
the point of “strategic competition”, 
increasing directly the possibility of a 
conflict between the hegemon and 
the rising power, approach commonly 
known as “The Chinese Threat 
Theory” (Tiezzi, 2014). In order to 
support this theory, many historical 
examples can be taken to support it; 
from the Peloponnesian War between 
Sparta and Athens to the Great Britain 
- Germany conflict and the Cold War 
bipolar order (Husenicova 2012). The 
same author admits that the Chinese 
economic rise could lead to some 
regional conflicts but the qualitative 
transformation of the Chinese society, 
as a natural consequence of the 
quantitative changes, would serve 
as a prevention from China’s conflict 
potential. (Husenicova, 2012).
The exceptionalists view of the 
issue is quite different.2 Their main 
argument is that: Eastern Asia is a 
particular part of the world where 
“China’s peaceful rise is possible 
1 such as the China - Vietnam war in 1979
2 Represented by David Kang, William H. Overholt, Kenneth D. Johnson 
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because a regional exceptionalism 
in general and a Chinese 
exceptionalism in particular have 
the potential to avoid an Asian 
Europe” (Evans, 2011, p.92). 
Scholar John Ikenberry states that 
the ruling liberal order of the world 
will have a direct impact on China 
in terms of increasing its economic 
interdependence and that the 
possible conflict would be a clear 
lose-lose enterprise for each side, so 
the clear aim should be to maintain 
peace in these relations (Sarkisyan, 
2014)
“The pragmatists’ school”, including 
different scholars such as Amitav 
Acharya or Robert S. Ross, stresses 
that the strong alliance system 
(backed by the soft regional economic 
interdependence represented mainly 
by ASEAN’s regional economic 
structures and initiatives) could be a 
powerful factor for the regional stability 
(Evans, 2011).  
   
Asian Regional Order
Considering all these different theoretical 
approaches, it can be observed that 
from a geopolitical point of view, “The 
Asian Theater” raises very complex 
questions for the future. According to 
Buzan (2012), there are four key trends, 
which define the current decade in the 
Asia Pacific Region: the ongoing rise 
of China and India, the weakening 
of the US, the ongoing struggle over 
defining an Asian regional identity, and 
the emergence of balancing against 
China. All of them are working on the 
intertwined base. For example, the 
hardening of Beijing’s positions on 
issues regarding the number of disputed 
Figure 1: The share of the Chinese GDP as of the world total
Source: Allen, 2013
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areas in Southern China’s sea (like the 
Spratley Islands or Senkaku / Diaoyu 
since 2008), has helped to keep the US 
presence in the area.  It has also helped 
to increase its influence through the 
intention of creating a new net of allies 
(or strengthening the existing one); 
despite of Washington’s weakening on 
the international stage.
However, there has been a large 
number of positive results as well. 
Since the 1978 reforms, China has 
integrated itself successfully in the 
regional Asian organizations, which 
pursue free trade agreements with 
the member states of ASEAN. It also 
joined the World Trade Organization 
in 2001 supported strongly by the 
US. It subsequently started to buy 
US bonds in exchange for accessing 
the US market; China also took an 
important part in the anti-piracy 
joint operations in the Indian Ocean 
(Buzan, 2012). The Chinese position 
in the Six-Party Talks (the talks among 
the two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia 
and the US, which aim to find peaceful 
resolutions to the concerns regarding 
the North Korean Nuclear Program) 
is a constructive contribution to 
the negotiation. This is so, although 
the process has not concluded yet 
through a comprehensive agreement 
(due to the launching of North Korean 
satellites and underground nuclear 
device detonations) (Panda, 2014).
The Chinese’s assertiveness rise can be 
described as a quite recent trend. The 
main objective and doctrine pursued 
by China in the post-Cold War era 
was the emphasis on a “peaceful rise” 
and “harmonious world.” In practice, 
China’s foreign policy during the 
post-Cold War years has been geared 
towards adapting to the imperatives 
of deepening into the economic 
globalization, cultivating its acceptance 
abroad and bringing about to change its 
regional and international status quo as 
its domestic and international paths are 
legitimized (Deng, 2009). Nevertheless, 
despite all the power debate, China has 
demonstrated a very flexible capacity 
to align, de-align, and realign during 
the years of the Cold War rather than 
accept the constraining bipolar logic 
of the period. After its initial strong 
alignment with the Soviet Union, Beijing 
broke away from Moscow in the early 
1960s and drew closer to Washington 
by the early 1970s. As concerns about 
the unipolar power configuration 
emerged in the 2000s, Beijing, once 
again, sought to establish a partnership 
with Moscow (Mohan, 2013). This 
fact seemed to be deepening during 
the recent Ukraine crisis. The growing 
need for commodities (having Russia 
as the closest basin of vital supplies) 
effectively pushes these two countries 
together despite of the various conflicts 
they have had to and will have to 
face in a foreseeable future (such as 
Russia’s decreasing demography and 
the Chinese illegal migration to Russia’s 
far east resourceful territories (Sieren, 
2014). 
 
However, Southern East Asia’s regional 
configuration of the relations are 
shaped differently. For a long period 
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after the Deng reforms, China has been 
trying to maintain good relations with 
its Southern East Asian neighbours due 
to various factors. In the early 1990s, 
after the violent suppression of the 
Tiananmen Square protest movement, 
the Western countries temporarily 
imposed sanctions on China. This 
measure allowed China to strengthen 
the orientation to the Eastern and 
South Eastern Asia countries. Likewise, 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
it was China that offered a substantial 
part of the support to the most affected 
countries: Thailand and Indonesia 
(MacDonald, 2016).
Chinese role in Asia
It should not be omitted the increasing 
activity China is exerting in the 
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). The SCO was 
established in 2001 and its members are 
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, but India, 
Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Mongolia, and 
Turkmenistan are observers. Although 
the activity of this organization seemed 
to be more stagnant recently, the 
summer summit hold in Tashkent in 
June 2016 brought two very important 
steps, the full- fledged membership 
of India and Pakistan and the future 
possible admission of Iran, just in 
original lines of the organization to 
exclude the US, bring in Russia, and link 
China to Central Asia. (Putz, 2016) The 
observers create crosslinks to South Asia 
and the Middle East connecting China 
with important sources of commodities 
and their export markets, amplifying 
the scope of the Chinese geopolitical 
projections to the areas of its vital 
interest (Buzan, 2012).
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied 
that there have been crises as well, 
traditionally between China and Taiwan. 
This complex relationship reached its 
crunch point in 1996 during the Taiwan 
Strait crisis. In this, China conducted 
a series of missile tests in the waters 
surroundings the islands, in an alleged 
attempt to exert an influence over the 
Taiwanese domestic policies (which 
indicated to stay away from China at 
that moment) (McDevitt, 2014).  
However, relations between 
China and Taiwan have improved 
considerably since those incidents. 
China became Taiwan’s number one 
trade partner, substituting their direct 
competition status for less aggressive 
economic policies (Meltzer, 2014). 
Although China is trying to attract 
Taiwan by promoting the “One state: 
two systems” policy (successfully 
implemented in Hong Kong and 
Macao)3, Taiwan does not seem to be 
3 Two territories of continental China in the colonial possession of Great Britain and Portugal respectively, 
transferred back to the Chinese administration in 1997 and 1999, which enjoy a special economic status 
under the Chinese administration.
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eager to join the PRC even under those 
conditions. The signature of the Cross-
Strait Service Trade Agreement (June 
25th, 2013) between China and Taiwan 
with the aim of liberalizing service 
trade between those two countries 
sparked a strong protest movement 
(denominated “The Sunflower Student 
Movement”) (Smith, 2015). On March 
19th, 2014, the movement occupied 
the Taiwanese parliament looking for 
the agreement to get unratified (Cole, 
2014). This is effectively showing that 
despite of the new chapter in the 
bilateral relations, there is still presence 
of the complex dark past.
The Triangle of Power
Other complex affairs seem to affect 
the relations between China and its 
strong regional pairs India and Japan. 
As Buzan states:
“The key to greater strategic interaction 
between South and East Asia is how 
the rise of India and China play both 
into each other and into the existing 
set of US alliances and engagements in 
Asia.
There is now quite a lot of evidence 
for the building up of a definite, if still 
quite low key, strategic interaction 
(rivals rather than enemies) between 
India and China.” (Buzan, 2012, p. 8).
The accelerated rise of India is another 
Asian successful story but from the 
geopolitical point of view, it represents 
one of the major challenges for the 
future in the region. Despite of the 
broad area of cooperation between 
China and India, there is a record of 
tensioned relations, mainly due to 
the mutual border issues known as 
the McMahon line. The privileged 
geographical position of India was 
already very well described by the 
late Lord Curzon, British Viceroy, at 
the beginning of the 20th century.  He 
wrote that Indian’s ‘‘central position 
in Asia means that the country can 
exert influence in many directions—
on Persia (nowadays Iran), Afghanistan 
and China—while controlling the sea 
routes to Australasia and the China 
Seas.” (Cited by Evans, 2010, p. 105).
According to the famous Indian 
political analyst Raja Mohan, for 
some sectors of the Indian foreign 
policy elite that have long dreamt 
of a powerful role of India in its 
surroundings, Curzon remains a source 
of foreign policy inspiration (Mohan, 
2004).  To put it in other words, there 
is a big chance that this dream now 
could come true. The economic rise 
of the Asian giant during the last 24 
years increases hope for New Delhi’s 
policymakers (surely causing scrutiny 
from the Chinese counterparts).  Due 
to the growing Chinese influence in 
the region, India is betting now a lot 
on a counter-balance through the 
creation of a closer relationship with 
the US since 2000; as a result, we 
have the recognition of India’s nuclear 
status through the US-Indian Nuclear 
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Agreement in 2005 (Pant, 2009). 
The first term used by Obama was 
well-marked by deepening of mutual 
relations. During her visit to India, 
the former US State Secretary Hilary 
Clinton gave an exclusive interview to 
Times of India under the headline: “I 
consider India’s global power a clear 
attempt to legitimize its position as a 
global affairs actor” (Goswami, 2009).
As a player in this game, India has a 
natural desire to avoid being trapped 
in the US-China’s possible rivalry. It is 
trying to develop its own independent 
and influential position in the Asian 
Pacific region through an ambitious 
(and slow moving) plan of building its 
own armed forces. What it pursues is to 
support its presence as the major local 
power in the Indian Ocean (Mohan, 
2015). India is now trying to develop 
good relations with Burma and Vietnam 
in an attempt to counterbalance the 
growing Chinese influence in South 
Asian region; however, it is not a new 
strategy for India. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, India implemented the 
“Look East Policy”, trying to adapt 
itself to the new global reality.  After 
the end of the Cold War (having lost its 
ally, the USSR) and after the successful 
reforms of 1991, India tried to make 
solid economic relations with Asian 
countries. Not to forget that these new 
allies would allow India to create a 
balance in the growth of the Chinese 
political and economic influence (and 
its neighbour, Pakistan despite their 
long record of complicated relations 
including three wars and an unresolved 
dispute about the border region of 
Kashmir) (Mohan, 2013).  In order 
to get resources from rich countries 
in Africa, China is implementing the 
“String of Pearls” strategy creating a 
net of ports through the Pacific and 
Indian Ocean. One of them, the 
Pakistani port town of Gwadar, has 
turned out to be an important Chinese 
asset offering an attractive solution to 
transport resources to China via rails 
and pipelines strategically more safely 
than the sea lines, where the Chinese 
navy does not have control yet. This 
condition turns India back to look for 
a closer cooperation with the US like 
Pakistan. It represents as well a crucial 
American ally in the region mainly for 
combating insurgent movements in 
Afghanistan (Kabraji, 2012).
The relation with Japan is a source of 
big future concerns because of many 
factors. Not only the recent territorial 
dispute over Diaoyu / Senkaku islands 
is sparking the nationalist moods 
in both countries but the history of 
mutual wars seems to continuously cast 
shadows over the bilateral relations. 
The executed Japanese Second World 
War criminals are buried in the sacred 
Shintoist shrine of Yasukuni and 
considered war heroes in Japan. This 
fact has raised a lot of resentment in 
China despite of their strong economic 
interdependence. China has been a 
receiver of the Japanese foreign direct 
investment since the 1980s, when 
many Japanese companies intended to 
outsource their production and reduce 
the prices of their products. Since the 
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outbreak of this territorial dispute, the 
Japanese investment in China started 
to decline. Even if the fall was not 
dramatic at that moment, this issue 
clearly demonstrates the tie between 
the Chinese geopolitical projection 
and its economic capabilities.  It is 
important to mention another fact 
regarding the same context. According 
to the Bank of Japan, China became 
Japan´s major creditor in 2010, 
owning USD$ 230 billion in short-term 
and long-term government bonds. It 
represents 3.6 % of the whole Chinese 
foreign currency reserves, emphasizing 
the fact that in the case of any political 
problem, the Japanese government 
will have to resolve the possible 
impact of this on its economy. (Zheng, 
2014).  However, the conflict’s threat 
could rapidly go beyond the field of 
economic measures. According to the 
US-Japan Security Treaty, the US is 
guaranteeing the security and defence 
of Japan (since Japan has a limited 
army called Self-Defence Forces and 
according to its anti-war Constitution, 
the use of its own army is strictly limited 
to protection of the Japanese territory). 
In the case of rising territorial tensions, 
the US could find itself trapped in the 
territorial conflict between China and 
Japan; this presumably would lead to 
broaden the conflict to almost global 
scale (Beina Xu, 2014). But Japan is 
not only relying on the US defence 
commitment. The Prime Minister, 
Shinzo Abe, in July 2014, announced 
that the Japanese constitution needs 
to be reassessed so the Japanese army 
should gain more relevance, not only 
in defending its territory but also in 
supporting its allies. (Fackler Sanger, 
2014). Even if his announcement 
sparked strong popular protests and 
the probability of making such a 
change in the Constitution is very 
low, this evidences important power 
transformations in the region. (Fackler 
Sanger, 2014).
Territorial disputes in the Asia 
Pacific Region    
          
The Asian security system represents a 
set of complex relations, which is not 
easy to manage, not even for the smaller 
countries in the region. The situation is 
even more complex because there is 
not any multilateral institution in place 
dealing directly with security issues. 
The ASEAN has often been credited 
as having a pacifying effect in South-
eastern Asia due to its promotion of 
regional cooperation (Haftel, 2012). 
Two ASEAN multilateral initiatives 
have been instrumental in promoting 
these ties: the ASEAN Regional 
Forum and the ASEAN Plus Three 
Initiative; it includes China, Japan, and 
South Korea covering all dominant 
regional players and engaging them 
effectively in the schemes of economic 
cooperation with the clear aim to 
nurture the ties with Japan, India, the 
US, and China. At the same time, the 
ASEAN proposes traditional attitudes 
of respecting sovereignty, promoting 
non-interference and territorial 
integrity, which constitute a hard-to-
THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CHINESE REFORM
62 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD
accomplish- attitude in the middle 
of the recent territorial disputes in 
the Eastern and Southern China Sea 
(Mohan, 2013). These disputes share 
some similarities and differences as 
well. The East China Sea territorial 
struggle involves only two claimants: 
China and Japan. The clash is about 
a small-uninhabited island claimed 
by both. This is connected to the 
interpretation of the US-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty (Bader, Lieberthal, 
McDevitt, 2014). According to this 
treaty (after its defeat in the Second 
World War) Japan would have limited 
military forces and budget destined for 
self- defence and the main burden of 
the military costs and presence would 
be borne by the US. This small trick 
helped Japan to outsource the military 
spending to this actor (the US) and led to 
an unprecedented rise of the Japanese 
economy, positioning Japan into the 
famous triad of the most developed 
regions in the world. However, the 
situation today is changing. There is 
a nationalist campaign sparked by 
China’s claims and the pressure from 
the US to engage more in military 
issues in the region as an impulse for 
the now stagnating Japanese economy. 
Nowadays, the South China Sea 
territorial claims are among a wider 
number of the claimants and pit China 
against The Philippines, Vietnam, 
Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan; 
according to Bader, the following 
issues are involved:
a) Highly emotional territorial claims 
in a region of rising nationalism. 
b) Risks of accidental conflict that 
could intensify. 
c) Conflicting claims to potentially 
rich resources4. 
d) Risks to navigation liberty in the 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
e) Disputes over the interpretation 
and applicability of international 
laws; notably the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
(Bader, Lieberthal, McDevitt, 
2014).
This rising assertiveness in which China 
is claiming various disputed islands is 
causing concern among the Asian states 
and is helping directly to strengthen 
the US presence in the area due to a 
policy of balancing. The US needs to 
reassure all its regional allies that would 
maintain strong security presence in 
the region and   counterbalance the 
Chinese influence in the South China 
Sea. But improving the military ties is 
not the only way to solve the problem.
The development of multilateral 
binding codes of conduct among China 
and the ASEAN countries regarding the 
South China Sea was already adopted 
in 2002 (ASEAN, 2002). However, no 
member has ever implemented its 
4 According to the US energy Information Administration, there are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas located in Southern China (US Energy Information Administration, 2013). 
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proposals or adhered to its provisions. 
China has historically preferred to 
handle all the disputes bilaterally and 
the mutual territorial claims between 
the ASEAN members prevented the 
implementation of the collective 
conduct treaty. Because of the lack of 
will to implement binding international 
norms, the military balancing seems to 
be the dominant strategy in the region. 
President Obama expressed his being 
in accordance with this during his 2014 
tour to the Asian Region. His travel 
itinerary included Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia and The Philippines; it can be 
inferred that his visiting to the last two 
mentioned countries is a clear sign of 
the US’ interest in strengthening those 
relations, as a reaction of the territorial 
disputes with China. President Obama 
was the first US president who visited 
Malaysia (since President Johnson’s visit 
in 1966) and security issues formed an 
important part of his agenda.  In the 
Philippines, Obama’s next stopover, 
his visit arranged the US-Philippines 
defence pact (for basing forces there), 
considering The Philippines as a 
major US’ not- NATO ally. With this 
agreement, the Asian country can 
use the renewed US’ engagement as 
support against the growing Chinese 
military and para-military presence in 
the South China Sea Region (Eilperin, 
2014).
It can be assumed that this journey 
represented an important step in the 
“Asian Pivot” Policy, a strategic initiative 
promoted by the US and focused on 
the shift of the US interest towards 
the Asia Pacific region. This strategic 
initiative does not restrict itself only 
to diplomatic and political activity. In 
2012, the official document Sustaining 
US Global Leadership emphasized that: 
“The US economic and security 
interests are inextricably linked to 
developments in the arc extending 
from the Western Pacific and East 
Asia into the Indian Ocean region 
and South Asia, creating a mix of 
evolving challenges and opportunities. 
Accordingly, while the US military 
will continue to contribute to security 
globally, we will of necessity rebalance 
toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our 
relationships with Asian allies and 
key partners are critical to the future 
stability and growth of the region. We 
will emphasize our existing alliances, 
which provide a vital foundation for 
Asia-Pacific security. We will also 
expand our networks of cooperation 
with emerging partners throughout 
the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective 
capability and capacity for securing 
common interests. The United States 
is also investing in a long-term strategic 
partnership with India to support its 
ability to serve as a regional economic 
anchor and provider of security in 
the broader Indian Ocean region. 
Furthermore, we will maintain peace 
on the Korean Peninsula by effectively 
working with allies and other regional 
states to deter and defend against 
provocation from North Korea, which 
is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons 
program”. (US Ministry Of Defence, 
2012, p.2). 
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The US diplomatic and economic 
efforts, as well as a military presence, 
are getting more concentrated on the 
Pacific scenario with the possibility of 
creating new alliances as an effective 
instrument of counterbalancing in the 
region. The question is whether this 
realignment of alliances constitutes the 
only possibility to contain the Chinese 
assertiveness. Many ASEAN states 
have expressed their concern of being 
trapped between the US and China’s 
arm race in the region (Mohan, 2013). 
So far, it can be assumed that the lack 
of mechanisms for a peaceful solution 
of the disputes among the states inside 
the Asian Regional System opens 
the possibility for the alignment and 
polarization of the relations, where 
the affected states are pressured to 
take a side in the competition.  The 
natural conditions of the Chinese 
economy’s rise are creating the natural 
conditions for the spread of China’s 
influence on its border territories, 
its “near abroad”. The term “near 
abroad” is basically used in connection 
with the Russian influence on its 
former Soviet republics or the outer 
regions of Europe (except the current 
enlargement territory of the European 
Union). This model could also now 
be applied to China’s neighbours, not 
only to its Eastern maritime border but 
to the continental land frontier as well 
(Fojtík, 2011).  But as other analysts 
stress out, the Chinese influence over 
the near abroad can take part of the 
soft hegemony unintentionally copying 
the US’ Monroe Doctrine, which led 
the US foreign policy towards its Latin 
American periphery (Holmes, 2012). 
One of the most important features of 
spreading the Chinese influence is the 
view China has on the former soviet 
Central Asian republics: important 
energy resources, raw materials, and 
markets for the manufacturing of 
Chinese goods.
However, the Chinese interest in the 
Asia goes beyond the ex-soviet Central 
Asian republics. The relations between 
China and Russia have improved 
considerably in recent years; the main 
reason for this policy is not a secret. 
The growth of the Chinese economy 
naturally creates an increase demand 
for energetic resources and the closest 
and most abundant source of these is 
Russia. 
The possession of a vast oil and 
gas reserve underpinned the re-
emergence of Russia as a great power 
(Petersen, Barysch, 2011).  At the same 
time, the access to energy is vital for 
China to sustain its economic growth 
thus the energy issue is one of the most 
important aims of the Chinese foreign 
policy. Just as Russia is relying heavily 
on energy exports, seeing them as tools 
to pursue its own geopolitical interests, 
China will remain the net importer of 
its oil. (Petersen, Barysch, 2011). The 
existence of common interests and 
the rapprochement between Russia 
and China based on the increasing 
economic interdependence could 
solidify the formal Sino-Russian alliance 
and create a new hub of political and 
economic power with a global scope.  
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Chinese “Look West” Policy     
       
China’s interest shift towards the West 
is relatively new. In October 2012, 
the most prominent and influential 
Chinese International Relations 
Scholar, Wang Jisi, stated that “March 
West” is an adequate articulated 
Chinese response to the growing 
US presence in Eastern Asia. (Yun, 
2013).  According to his opinion, the 
Westwards area of the Chinese border 
is not under such pressing relations as 
the Pacific Region. This opens the path 
for China’s political and economic 
penetration and even a space for 
cooperating with the US (because of 
the common interest in the area and 
the decreasing US engagement after 
its retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan). 
This lets space for strengthening the 
Chinese ties even in the Middle East, 
despite of the fact that China has 
been signing important agreements 
with Iran, whose nuclear program is 
considered highly controversial by 
the Western powers; so the Chinese 
presence in the area has already a very 
solid base (McDevitt, 2014). The new 
“Look West Strategy” is even more 
ambitiously articulated with the New 
Silk Road Project, with the aim to 
connect the Chinese industrial centres 
with their European counterparts 
through train networks and maritime 
lines. According to the Chinese press 
agency Xinhua, President Li took a 
march along the Silk Road in autumn, 
FIGURE 2: China’s military spending from 2000 to 2014.
Source: Statista, 2016
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2014; he visited all the Central Asian 
post-soviet republics, linking the Silk 
Road member countries with the SCO 
members and stepped up the project 
by creating an Asian Infrastructure 
Bank. It invests mainly in infrastructure 
projects in Central Asia as the first steps 
on the road to reach Europe (Xinhua, 
2014). The argument to support this 
strategy is that for the Chinese-owned 
companies, it is much easier to operate 
in the Central Asian region than in 
Russia itself, making simultaneously 
these republics dependent on Chinese 
capital inflow. China achieved to 
replace Russia as the major trading 
partner to the Central Asian Republics 
and, at the same time, it became the 
main destination of the major part of 
the local gas production. (Casey, 2014). 
At the same time, in Central Asia, 
Beijing is a preferred partner for the 
regions many autocratic governments 
who welcome Chinese non-
interference in their affairs. (Johnson, 
2016). Nevertheless, the New Silk 
Road remains a very broad concept 
with a very modest institutional 
background behind. So far only 
mechanisms for finding the New Silk 
road were created. The Chinese- only 
New Silk Road Fund has been created 
and a multilateral Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. (Kaczmarski, 
Rodkiewicz, 2016). Despite of the 
recent nature of this institution, several 
European big countries like United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy 
supported this step despite of heated 
objections from the USA (Johnson, 
2016). Anyway, the project of the New 
Silk Road will have a direct impact on 
65 countries in the region, where 55% 
of the world GDP, 70% of the world 
population, and 75% of the world 
energetic reserves are concentrated. 
(Vidales Garcia, 2016)  
Nonetheless, for now we can assume 
that there is no imminent danger of 
a conflict on the Chinese continental 
border despite of the Chinese 
geopolitical penetration of Central 
Asia. The other important player in 
the zone, Russia is struggling with 
Western economic sanctions, and in 
the search for diversifying its economy 
is looking more for cooperation than 
confrontation with China. (Teufel Dryer, 
2016) As a result, the possible future 
conflict is far more likely to happen 
in the Chinese oceanic periphery, 
where the Chinese dependence on 
the foreign oil would push China 
inevitably to develop its blue water 
navy fleet in order to protect its supply 
lines.  Despite of the recent reforms, 
the Chinese economy still stayed an 
export-oriented economy. As such, 
it is in a position of dependency. No 
matter how large its currency reserves 
or how advanced its technology, or 
how cheap its labour force, China still 
depends on the willingness of other 
countries to import its goods, as well 
as the ability to physically ship them. 
Any disruption of this flow has a 
direct effect on the Chinese economy 
and, subsequently, an impact on the 
political stability and regime legitimacy 
(an issue that the Chinese Communist 
Party does not want to question for 
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sure) (Friedman, 2008). Agnew uses a 
similar argument: the huge size of the 
Chinese manufacturing sector and its 
export orientation allowed China to 
become the world’s major creditor 
country by attaching its currency to 
the US Dollar, and recreating for itself 
a stability that was associated to the 
Bretton-Woods monetary system of 
1944-1974 (Agnew, 2010).  The main 
problem with the export-oriented 
economies is that controlling the 
external demand remains outside the 
producing state, which only possess a 
few tools to control prices. The recent 
economic situation in which China has 
become the industrial workshop of the 
world (which makes it very dependent 
on the world to keep buying its goods) 
is hard to manage during a global 
economic recession.
Given this situation, a logic step is to 
pursue the plan of reforms aiming 
mainly to improving the conditions 
of the Chinese population (living 
standards) and strengthening the 
domestic demand. Although regarding 
the size of the Chinese population, 
only a smaller, urban part of it would 
feel the real impact of these in the near 
future. In order to mitigate this gap, 
the Chinese government will have to 
search a way to re-distribute the fruits 
of the still impressive growth among 
the large categories of the population. 
The creation of the gap in terms of 
accessibility to social benefits between 
the smaller urban and a large number 
of the rural population was natural on 
the early stages of the reform. However, 
it should be bridged in the process of 
developing because it can represent the 
source of a growing political instability. 
The second main trend of the recent 
Chinese development, the State 
projects supported by Keynesianism 
(to stimulate the economy), will have 
a direct impact on its infrastructural 
development; this trend would favour 
the connections and amplify the reach 
of the Chinese interests: the giant 
projects of trail connections between 
China, Germany, or Russia, the New 
Silk Road. This will naturally strengthen 
the relations between China and 
its neighbouring countries pointing 
clearly to an increasing economic 
interdependence.
Although the relations of economic 
interdependence generally tend to 
diminish the possibility of conflicts 
among the states, it cannot be forgotten 
that the rising economic potential of 
China (estimated growth of 6.7 % by 
2016 according to the World Bank, a 
very robust one) is causing a direct impact 
on the trend to expand control over 
strategic territories and shipping lines 
outside the borders of China. (World 
Bank, 2016). This reality inevitably differ 
from the other states’ interests in the 
region, making it prone to the possible 
conflict of different scales. 
 
Conclusions
The outward projection of the Chinese 
geopolitics is, probably, the most 
visible security issue since the end of 
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the Cold War. It is seriously shaping the 
relations, not only in the Asian Pacific 
region, but also redrawing the power 
balance in Asia. 
The future of this development is raising 
questions about the possible responses 
from other Asian countries. The natural 
interest of these countries would be to 
follow the regional tradition of peace, 
which creates a regional institutional 
backup to mitigate the possibility 
of new frictions. However, the Asia 
Pacific region is currently a witness 
of the strengthening and creation of 
military alliances and the even stronger 
military presence of the US.
The increasing military spending, 
together with populist policies in the 
countries engaged in territorial claims, 
can be potentially dangerous for the 
future; the economic interdependence 
could be used as an effective tool to 
avoid small- scale or big-scale conflicts. 
 
The normative backup, such as 
codes of conduct, have proved to be 
ineffective in the South China Sea so 
far since the mutual territorial claims 
between the member states prevent 
cooperation.
The current change of the Chinese 
macroeconomic model and the 
slowdown of its economy can 
temporarily de-escalate the ongoing 
territorial conflicts because China will 
have to turn its attention towards its 
economic and domestic policies.  
However, the process of acquiring 
economic, military, and political 
capabilities will inevitably affect the 
relations and stability in the Pacific 
region and in Asia as a whole. On 
a global stage, the rising Chinese 
economy has created strong ties with 
the developed countries (as markets 
for Chinese goods) and with the less 
developed countries (mainly as a 
source of raw materials needed for the 
Chinese industry). 
The economic “soft power” seems 
to be very effective in acquiring the 
influence, but the next logical step 
for China would be to acquire the 
capability of control and dominance of 
vital maritime space. All this is pushing 
China towards more assertive relations 
with the US. 
The increased Chinese presence in the 
region is posing a serious challenge for 
the US and their allies; a challenge in 
new qualitative conditions (not faced 
since the end of the Cold War). To avoid 
such a tense situation, the creation of a 
common regional multilateral platform 
for negotiation would be a solution 
to prevent the possible conflicts in an 
area full of weapons.
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